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Abstract—In this paper, a new contract signing protocol is 
proposed based on the RSA signature scheme. The protocol will 
allow two parties to sign the same contract and then exchange 
their digital signatures. The protocol ensures fairness in that it 
offers parties greater security: either both parties receive each 
other's signatures or neither does. The protocol is based on 
offline Trusted Third Party (TTP) that will be brought into play 
only if one party fails to sign the contract. Otherwise, the TTP 
remains inactive. The protocol consists of only three messages 
that are exchanged between the two parties. 
Keywords-contract signing; fair exchange protocol; digital 
signature; protocols; security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Contracts play an important role in many business 
transactions. Traditionally, paper-based contracts are signed by 
the transacting parties who need to be present at the same 
venue and at the same time. Each party signs a copy of the 
contract for every contracting party so that every party has a 
copy of the signed contract.  
If the parties, however, are not able to meet to sign the 
paper-based contract, then signing an electronic contract is an 
alternative. The problem with signing electronic contracts, 
however, is exchanging the signatures of the parties, especially 
where there is a lack of trust between parties. One party may 
send the other party their signature on the contract but may not 
receive the signature of the other party in return. To solve the 
problems of exchanging digital signatures, contract signing 
protocols are used [3, 4, 5, 9, 10]. Contract Signing Protocols 
ensure that either contracting parties receive each other's 
signature or none does. 
In this paper, a new, efficient contract signing protocol is 
proposed. The proposed protocol is based on offline trusted 
third party (TTP) that brought into play only if one party fails 
to send their signature on the contract. In the normal execution 
of the protocol, the two parties will exchange their signatures 
directly. 
This paper is organized as follows. Related work is 
presented in section II. Section III presents the proposed 
protocol that comprises the exchange protocol and dispute 
resolution protocol. The analysis of the proposed protocol is 
discussed in section IV. The comparison of the proposed 
protocol with related protocols is presented in section V. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Early contract signing protocols (as in [7, 16]) allow the 
parties to exchange their signatures directly without any 
involvement from third party. That is, the parties gradually 
exchange their signatures in part until both signatures are 
complete. If one party fails to send an additional part of the 
signature, the other party works to search for that remaining 
part. The gradual exchange protocols are based on the 
assumption that the two parties have the same computational 
power to ensure fairness. However, in most applications this 
assumption is not realistic [5]. The gradual exchange protocols 
require a large number of rounds to complete the exchange of 
signatures. 
To overcome the problems of gradual exchange of 
signatures, a trusted third party (TTP) is used in contract 
signing protocols. The TTP helps the contracting parties to 
exchange their signatures in a reliable and secure manner. The 
TTP can be used online or offline. 
In the online-based third party contract signing protocols 
[as in 6, 8,10] the TTP will be actively involved in the 
exchange of the signatures between the parties. The parties will 
sign the contract and send their signatures to the TTP who will 
verify the signatures and if they are correctly verified the TTP 
will forward the signatures to the parties. The main problem 
with this approach is that the TTP is involved in every 
exchange and this may create a bottleneck. In addition to this, 
the fees of the third party make this a costly approach. 
In the offline-based third party contract signing protocols 
[as in 3, 4, 5, 11, 13 (also called optimistic – 11)], the parties 
will directly exchange each other's signatures on a contract. If 
one party fails to submit their signature, the third party will be 
brought in to resolve any dispute. In the offline-based third 
party contract signing protocols, the TTP is rarely involved 
which reduces the cost of running TTP. Also, the turnaround 
time is eliminated since the parties exchange their signatures 
directly. 
A category of offline TTP-based contract signing protocols 
has been proposed [3, 4, 5]. This category overcomes the 
farness problem by using verifiable and recoverable encrypted 
signatures. This approach will generally work as described 
below. Let‟s say that two contracting parties, Alice and Bob, 
want to exchange their signatures on a contract.  
  
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, 
Vol. 3, No. 3, 2012 
68 | P a g e  
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 
Alice will sign the contract, encrypt the signature and then 
send the encrypted signature to Bob. Bob will then verify the 
encrypted signature and if it is correctly verified, send his 
signature to Alice. If Alice finds that Bob's signature is correct 
then she will send the decryption key to Bob to decrypt her 
encrypted signature. If Alice fails to send the decryption key, 
Bob will contact the TTP to recover the decryption key. 
Nenadic, Zhang and Barton[3] proposed a fair signature 
exchange protocol. The protocol is based on the verifiable and 
recoverable encryption of signatures on a contract. Alice will 
send her partially encrypted signature to Bob who will be able 
to verify it. If the encrypted signature is correctly verified then 
Bob will send Alice his signature. On receiving Bob's 
signature, Alice will verify it and if it is correctly verified then 
Alice will send the decryption key to Bob to decrypt the 
encrypted signature. If Alice does not send the decryption key, 
Bob will contact the TTP to recover Alice's signature. 
Ateniese [4] also proposed a fair contract signing protocol. 
Ateniese's protocol is based on the verifiable and recoverable 
encryption of a signature. If Alice and Bob want to exchange 
their signatures on a contract then the protocol will work as 
follows. Alice will first sign the contract, then encrypt the 
signed contract with the public key of the trusted third party 
(TTP). Alice will then send Bob: (1) the encrypted signature, 
(2) evidence stating that Alice has correctly encrypted her 
signature on the contract. On receiving Alice's message, Bob 
will verify the evidence. If the evidence is valid then Bob will 
send his signature on the contract to Alice. On receiving Bob's 
signature, Alice will verify it and if it is valid then Alice will 
send her signature on the contract to Bob. If Alice does not 
send her signature to Bob or Alice's signature is invalid then 
Bob can contact the TTP to resolve the dispute.  
Wang [5] proposed a protocol for signing contracts online. 
Their protocol is based on the RSA signature. If Alice and Bob 
are planning to exchange their signatures on a contract using 
Wang's protocol [5] then Alice will first split her private key 
into two parts d1 and d2. Only d2 will be sent to TTP. Alice 
will send Bob her partial signature that was signed using d1. 
On receiving Alice's partial signature, Bob will initiate an 
interactive zero-knowledge protocol with Alice to check 
whether Alice's partial signature is correct. If it is correctly 
verified then Bob will send his signature to Alice. After Alice 
receives Bob's signature, Alice will verify it and if it is 
correctly verified then Alice will send Bob the second part of 
her signature. If, however, Alice did not send the second part of 
the signature, Bob can contact the TTP to resolve the dispute. 
In this paper, we propose a new approach that uses 
verifiable and recoverable encryption of signatures that will 
allow the party who receives the encrypted signature to verify 
it. If he / she correctly verifies the encrypted signature, then it 
is safe for this party to release his / her signature to the other 
party because the TTP can be contacted to recover the signature 
if the other party fails to submit his / her signature. The 
proposed protocol does not use the interactive zero-knowledge 
proofs for verifying the encrypted signature as in [4 & 5]. 
Rather, the contract certificate that is introduced in this paper 
will allow the party who receives the encrypted signature to 
verify it. 
III. THE PROPOSED CONTRACT SIGNING PROTOCOL 
A. Notations 
The following represents the notations used in the proposed 
protocol: 
 Pa, Pb, and Pt: parties a, b, and TTP, respectively. 
 C: The contract to be signed by Pa and Pb 
 C.at: the certificate for the shared public key between Pa 
and Pt. C.at is issued by Pt. A standard X.509 certificate 
[12] can be used to implement C.at 
 Pkx = (ex, nx): RSA Public Key [14] of the party x, 
where nx is a public RSA modulus and ex is a public 
exponent 
 Skx = (dx, nx): RSA Private Key [14] of the party x, 
where nx is a public RSA modulus and dx is a private 
exponent 
 h(M): a strong-collision-resistant one-way hash 
function 
 enc.pkx(M): an RSA [14] encryption of message M 
using the public key pkx (ex, nx). The encryption of M 
is computed as follows: enc.pkx(M) = M
ex mod nx 
 enc.skx(Z): an RSA [14] decryption of Z using the 
private key skx (dx, nx). The decryption of Z is 
computed as follows: enc.skx(Z) = Z
dx mod nx 
 Sig.x(M): the RSA digital signature [14] of the party x 
on M. The digital signature of party x on M is 
computed by encrypting the hash value of M using the 
private key skx(dx, nx). 
 C-Cert: the contract certificate. C-Cert is issued by CA. 
The contents of C-Cert are: 
o heSig: the hash value of the signature of Pa 
on the contract encrypted with pkat i.e. 
"h(enc.pkat(Sig.a(C)))"  
o hC: hash value of the contract 
o CA's signature on C-Cert 
 Px → Py: M, means party x sends message M to party y 
 X + Y: concatenation of X and Y 
B. Assumptions 
The following represents the assumptions used in the 
proposed protocol: 
 Channels between Pa, Pb and Pt are resilient i.e. all sent 
messages will be received by their intended recipients 
 Parties will use the same hashing, encryption, 
decryption algorithms. 
 Pt is trusted by all parties and will not collude with any 
other party 
 Parties Pa and Pb will agree on the contract before the 
protocol starts 
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 Parties (Pa, Pb and Pt) already have their public keys 
and they are certified from CA 
C. Registration 
In the registration phase, Pa needs to do the following: 
 Pa will request from Pt to share an RSA public key with 
it. The shared public key is denoted as pkat = (eat, nat) 
and its corresponding private key is denoted as skat = 
(dat, nat). Pt will certify the shared public key and issue 
the shared public key certificate C.at 
 Pa will sign the contract "C" using its private key ska as 
Sig.a (C) and then send the following to CA to certify 
the encrypted signature and issue C-Cert:  
 Sig.a (C) + C + C.at  
On receiving Pa's request, CA will verify if the received 
signature is for the contract C included in Pa's 
message. If so, then CA will encrypt Sig.a(C) using the 
shared public key pkat that is included in C.at. That is, 
CA will compute: 
enc.pkat (Sig.a(C)) 
Then, CA will issue C-Cert that includes the items 
mentioned in the "Notations" section. 
D. Exchange Protocol 
The exchange protocol represents the normal execution of 
the protocol. It consists of the following three steps (see Fig. 1): 
1. [E-M1]: Pa → Pb: C + C.at + C-Cert + 
enc.pkat(Sig.a(C)) 
2. [E-M2]: Pb → Pa: Sig.b(C) 
3. [E-M3]: Pa → Pb: Sig.a(C) 
 
Figure 1. Exchange Protocol 
Step [E-M1]: Pa encrypts the signed contract with the 
shared public key pkat. Pa then sends the items C, C.at, C-Cert, 
enc.pkat(Sig.a(C)) to Pb.  
Step [E-M2]: once Pb receives E-M1 then they will do the 
following verifications: 
1. Pb will verify the correctness of both C.at and C-Cert 
by verifying the signatures on these certificates.  
2. If the certificates are correctly verified then Pb will 
compute the hash value of the contract and then 
compare it with "hC" that is included in C-Cert.  
3. Pb will also need to verify the correctness of the 
encrypted signature of Pa on the contract i.e. Pb will 
verify "enc.pkat (Sig.a(C))". To verify the encrypted 
signature, Pb will compute the hash value of 
"enc.pkat(Sig.a(C))" then compare it with "heSig" that 
is included in C-Cert. If they match, it means that Pa 
encrypted the correct signature. 
If all verifications are correct then Pb will sign the contract 
using their private key skb then will send the signed contract 
"Sig.b(C)" to Pa. 
Step [E-M3]: once Pa receives Sig.b (C), Pa will verify Pb's 
signature. That is, Pa will decrypt the signature to get the hash 
value of the contract then compare it with "hC" that is included 
in C-Cert. If Pb's signature is correctly verified then Pa will send 
their signature Sig.a(C) to Pb 
Once Pb receives Sig.a(C) then Pb will verify it by 
decrypting the signature to get the hash value of the contract 
and compare it with "hC" that is included in C-Cert. If the 
verification is correct then the received signature is correct. 
Now, both Pa and Pb have each other's signatures on the 
contract. Therefore, fairness is ensured. If Pa did not send E-M3 
or sent incorrect E-M3 then Pb can contact Pt using the dispute 
resolution protocol to resolve the dispute. 
E. Dispute Resolution Protocol 
 
 
Figure 2. Dispute Resolution Protocol 
If Pb did not receive the step E-M3 or received an incorrect 
E-M3, Pb can contact Pt to resolve the dispute. The dispute 
resolution protocol consists of the following three steps (see 
Fig. 2): 
1. [DR-M1]: Pb → Pt: C + C.at + C-Cert + 
enc.pkat(Sig.a(C)) + Sig.b(C) 
2. [DR-M2]: Pt → Pa: Sig.b(C) 
3. [DR-M3]: Pt → Pb: Sig.a(C) 
 Step [DR-M1]: if Pb did not receive the correct 
signature or did not receive the signature at all then Pb will 
send message DR-M1 to Pt to request a resolution.  
Step [DR-M2]: once Pt receives DR-M1 then they will do 
the following verifications: 
 Pt will verify the correctness of C.at and C-Cert by 
checking the signatures on these certificates.  
 If the certificates are correctly verified then Pt will 
verify the correctness of the encrypted signature of Pa 
on the contract i.e. enc.pkat(Sig.a(C)). To verify the 
encrypted signature, Pt will either (i) compute the hash 
value of enc.pkat (Sig.a(C)) then compare it with 
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"heSig" that is included in C-Cert. If they match it 
means that Pa encrypted the correct signature, or (ii) Pt 
has the private key "skat" corresponding to the shared 
public key so it can decrypt the encrypted signature i.e. 
enc.pkat (Sig.a (C)) and then decrypt the signature with 
pka and compare the decrypted hash with "hC" that is 
included in C-Cert. 
 Pt will also verify Sig.b (C) by decrypting the signature 
with pkb then comparing the decrypted hash with "hC" 
that is included in C-Cert. 
If all verifications are correct then Pt will send the message 
DR-M2 to Pa and DR-M3 to Pb. DR-M2 includes the signature 
of Pb on the contract.  
The signature of Pb on the contract is sent to Pa to ensure 
fairness in the case where Pb contacted Pt after receiving E-M1 
i.e. Pb may cheat by contacting Pt before sending E-M2 to Pa. 
Step [DR-M3]: Pt will send Sig.a (C) to Pb in DR-M3 
Now, both Pa and Pb have each other's signature on the 
contract. Fairness is ensured either in the exchange protocol or 
in the dispute resolution protocol if Pa acts dishonestly.  
IV. ANALYSIS 
The fairness property in our protocol will be evaluated by 
studying the following four cases: (1) the first case where Pa is 
honest and Pb is dishonest, (2) the second case where Pa is 
dishonest and Pb is honest, (3) the third case where both Pa and 
Pb are dishonest, and (4) the forth case where both Pa and Pb 
are honest. 
 
 Case 1: If Pa is honest and Pb is dishonest. Pb acts 
dishonestly by sending an incorrect signature to Pa or 
by contacting Pt before sending his signature to Pa. In 
the first scenario where Pb sends an incorrect signature 
to Pa, Pa will check Pb's signature. Then if it is 
incorrect, Pa will not send his signature to Pb in E-M3. 
In the second scenario where Pb contacted Pt before 
sending his signature to Pa, Pt will check Pb's request 
and if it is correctly verified then Pt will send the 
resolution to both Pa and Pb. Therefore, fairness is 
ensured 
 Case 2: Pa is dishonest and Pb is honest. Pa can act 
dishonestly by sending the incorrect E-M1, sending 
the incorrect E-M3 or not sending the E-M3 at all. In 
the scenario where Pa sends incorrect E-M1, Pb will 
verify E-M1 as described in section III. If Pb finds that 
E-M1 is incorrect, they will not send their signature to 
Pa in E-M2. In this scenario no one reveals their 
signature at this stage. In the scenarios where Pa sends 
incorrect E-M3 to Pb or Pa does not send E-M3, Pb can 
contact Pt to recover Pa's signature.  
 Case 3: both Pa and Pb are dishonest. Pa can act 
dishonestly by sending the incorrect E-M1, sending 
the E-M3 or not sending the E-M3 at all. Pb can act 
dishonestly by sending an incorrect signature to Pa or 
by contacting Pt before sending his signature to Pa. 
The scenarios of case 3 are discussed in cases 1 and 2 
above. 
 Case 4: both Pa and Pb are honest. If both Pa and Pb act 
honestly then fairness will be ensured in the exchange 
protocol and there is no need to contact Pt at all. 
Therefore, the above analysis of the four cases shows that 
the fairness is ensured either in the exchange protocol or in the 
dispute resolution protocol. 
It is worth mentioning that Pt does not need to receive any 
message from Pa in order to resolve any dispute raised by Pb. 
Rather, Pt will receive the dispute request from Pb and then 
will decide if Pb's request is valid or not. If the request is valid 
then Pt will send the resolution electronically to both Pb and Pa. 
The certificate C-Cert is unique for each exchange. That is, 
every time Pa and Pb need to exchange their signatures on a 
contract then a new certificate will be used. The shared public 
key certificate C.at, however, can be used for signing an 
unlimited number of contracts. 
Pt is passive during the exchange protocol i.e. in the 
normal execution of the protocol Pa and Pb will not need to 
contact Pt. In case Pa misbehaves then Pt will be contacted by 
Pb to resolve the dispute. 
V. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK 
The proposed protocol will be compared against contract 
signing protocols that are based on verifiable and recoverable 
encryption of signatures, namely, Nenadic, Zhang and Barton 
protocol [3], Ateniese's protocol [4] and Wang's protocol [5].  
For the comparison, we analyze the number of messages 
and the number of modular exponentiations in both the 
exchange protocol and dispute resolution protocol. The 
exponentiation is the most expensive cryptographic operation 
in the finite field [5]. 
Both the proposed protocol and Ateniese's Protocol [4] 
have three messages in the exchange protocol whereas Wang 
Protocol [5] has seven messages. All protocols have three 
messages in the dispute resolution protocol. 
Regarding the modular exponentiations in the exchange 
protocol, the proposed protocol has the lowest number of 
modular exponentiations, with only six. Nenadic, Zhang and 
Barton protocol [3] has the lowest number of modular 
exponentiations in the dispute resolution protocol with only 
five modular exponentiations. Our protocol has seven modular 
exponentiations in the dispute resolution protocol. 
Ateniese's Protocol [4] and Wang's protocol [5] require 
interactive zero-knowledge proofs to allow one party to verify 
the encrypted signature of the other party. Our protocol offers 
greater efficiency in that it allows the receiving party to verify 
the encrypted signature using the contract certificate (C-Cert). 
From Table 1, it is clear that the proposed protocol is more 
efficient compared with the related protocols except for the 
dispute resolution protocol as Nenadic, Zhang and Barton [3] 
protocol has the lowest number of modular exponentiations. 
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A new offline TTP-based fair contract signing protocol is 
proposed in this paper. The proposed protocol ensures the 
exchange of signatures of two parties on a contract. At the end 
of the execution of the protocol, both parties get each other's 
signatures or neither does. The proposed protocol comprises of 
only three messages in the exchange protocol as well as only 
three messages in the dispute resolution protocol. If one party 
evades during the execution of the protocol, the protocol 
provides an online resolution for the disputes where the TTP 
will be involved. The proposed protocol is efficient as it has the 
lowest number of modular exponentiations in the exchange 
protocol. In a future study, we plan to investigate how to make 
the protocol an abuse-free protocol as Wang did in [5]. We also 
intend to implement and integrate the proposed protocol with e-
commerce applications for the exchange of digital signatures 
between two parties. 
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